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Defending a Rule of Institutional Autonomy on 
 “No-Harm” Grounds 
Mark Tushnet.∗ 
My comments begin by focusing on Professor Hamilton’s 
defense of the “no-harm” principle—that is, the principle that 
legislatures have the general authority to make their rules applicable 
when those rules aim to reduce the incidence of harms defined with 
reference only to secular standards.1 Professor Hamilton argues that 
the no-harm principle conflicts with legal rules that give religious 
institutions some sort of autonomy in their actions.2 And indeed it 
does in one sense: One can define the no-harm principle to rule out 
claims of institutional autonomy. 
Understood in another way, however, the no-harm principle 
leaves room for institutional autonomy or for exemptions of religious 
institutions from the application of rules aimed at reducing the 
incidence of harm. The argument I sketch here for institutional 
autonomy is basically empirical and agrees with Professor Hamilton 
in making harm-reduction the overriding social goal. The argument 
proceeds in two steps. First, I suggest that autonomous institutions 
may be able to socialize their adherents more effectively than 
institutions that lack autonomy and that—if the institutions’ values 
are compatible with the legislature’s—their more effective 
socialization can produce a net reduction in the harms inflicted by 
the institutions’ members. Second, autonomy for all institutions can 
be defended if the gains from assuring autonomy for groups whose 
 ∗ Carmack Waterhouse Professor of Constitutional Law, Georgetown University Law 
Center. 
 1. In doing so, I will say nothing about history, in terms of either original 
understandings or the evolution of constitutional doctrine, and very little about particular 
doctrinal formulations. Instead, I will treat the choice as binary, between the no-harm principle 
understood as a version of rationality review and the compelling-interest or necessity standard. 
Professor Scharffs’s contribution suggests the important point that there may be no general 
approach to these problems at all, but rather only a number of topic-specific rules. See Brett G. 
Scharffs, The Autonomy of Church and State, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1217.  
 2. Marci A. Hamilton, Religious Institutions, the No-Harm Doctrine, and the Public 
Good, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1099. 
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values are compatible with the legislature’s values exceed the losses 
from doing so for groups with values the legislature rejects. 
After developing the general structure of the argument for 
institutional autonomy, I raise several questions about it. Denying 
institutions autonomy may weaken but not destroy their ability to 
socialize effectively, and perhaps careful attention to questions of 
design and their effects might allow us to come up with rules that 
give institutions autonomy in some restricted domains while 
subjecting them to regulation elsewhere. Additionally, the argument 
I develop is cast in terms of institutions generally, and I explore 
briefly the proposition that there is nothing distinctive about 
religious institutions that should lead us to give them, but not other 
institutions of civil society, autonomy. And, in conclusion, I wonder 
whether the essentially empirical argument I develop is one that 
courts can appropriately invoke, evaluate, and apply. 
Consider the following possibility. Some general rule aims at 
reducing the occurrence of discrimination on the basis of sex. A 
particular religious institution is committed by the tenets of its faith 
to nondiscrimination on the basis of sex.3 Of course, real people 
inevitably fall short of full compliance with the tenets of their 
religion. So there will be some incidents of discrimination on the 
basis of sex as the institution goes about its daily operations. 
Professor Hamilton’s “no-harm” principle allows the 
government to invoke its antidiscrimination laws against those 
incidents of discrimination.4 But perhaps external supervision of the 
institution’s operation—supervision of the sort exemplified by 
holding the institution liable for sex discrimination—undermines the 
effectiveness of the religion to inculcate the nondiscrimination norm 
as a matter of religious belief. That is, absent external supervision, 
the religion teaches its adherents that discrimination is wrong, the 
adherents believe the message, and they act on the belief with a high 
degree of compliance. Allow external supervision, however, and the 
adherents will not hear the message as effectively, or will not believe 
it as strongly, or will not bring their actions into compliance with the 
 3. I am a bit uncomfortable with the standard formulation used here, which refers to 
“religious institutions” as if the institutions themselves were somehow religious, rather than as 
if they were—as they are—institutions whose members and participants self-consciously 
identify the work they do in the institution with a particular religious tradition. I use the 
standard formulation because it makes exposition easier. 
 4. Hamilton, supra note 2, at 1159. 
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(religious) nondiscrimination norm. In these circumstances, the net 
effect of recognizing institutional autonomy—relative to the world 
governed strictly by the no-harm principle—is a reduction in secular 
harm. Here, institutional autonomy serves the no-harm principle, 
rather than being in conflict with it.5 
I turn to filling in the sketch a bit, in a relatively informal way, to 
capture the intuitions that lie behind the argument. I will highlight 
two primary motivations that justify a rule of institutional autonomy. 
The first motivating idea is that the harm-preventing behavior some 
institutions generate sometimes exceeds the harms the institutions 
inevitably generate. That should be uncontroversial.6 The second 
motivating idea is more easily questioned. Sometimes an institution’s 
autonomy from external supervision is a condition of an institution’s 
ability to generate more harm-preventing behavior than harm. The 
picture here is this: We want institutions to socialize people well, 
meaning that they should induce people to avoid inflicting secular 
harms. To accomplish that socialization, institutions must teach their 
members or subjects that certain behavior is undesirable or 
unacceptable. But, the argument is, sometimes an institution that is 
autonomous of external supervision is a more effective teacher than 
one that is subject to such supervision—and is more effective because 
of that autonomy. 
A story may help illustrate why this might be true. Those in 
charge of a religiously affiliated institution say, “You must avoid 
discriminating on the basis of sex because such actions are 
inconsistent with our religious precept that all are equal in God’s 
eyes.” A person prone to discriminate on the basis of sex replies, 
“Well, you’re just saying that because the government—not God—
has told you to say it. If you don’t say it, you’re going to have to pay 
out a lot of money if I act on my inclinations. Your motivation is just 
to save money, not to teach me to act in accordance with God’s 
word. And because of that, you haven’t really given me a ground for 
refraining from acting on my inclinations.” If the institution is 
protected by a rule of institutional autonomy, its leaders can reply, 
 5. The argument I have sketched is a version of the argument that rule-utilitarianism is 
a better form of utilitarianism than act-utilitarianism because, when implemented in the real 
world, action pursuant to (the right set of) rules produces more utility than action pursuant to 
act-by-act judgments of what maximizes utility. For an introduction to the debates, see 
generally J.J.C. SMART & BERNARD WILLIAMS, UTILITARIANISM: FOR AND AGAINST (1973). 
 6. It better be, if we are to have institutions at all. 
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“No, no, not at all. Because of the rule of institutional autonomy, we 
don’t have any liability concerns at all. When we say 
nondiscrimination is required by our religion, we are telling you 
what God—not the government—has told us.” Obviously the 
argument I have just sketched depends crucially on empirical 
judgments, most notably those concerning the impact of external 
supervision on a religious institution’s ability to inculcate its precepts 
and elicit behavior consistent with those precepts. 
The scenario just sketched does not—yet—set out a case for a 
general rule of institutional autonomy. The argument as presented 
may justify institutional autonomy for those religions with religious 
definitions of harm consistent with the secular harms the legislature 
identifies.7 But not all religions have such precepts; indeed, some 
may have religious beliefs that flatly reject the proposition that the 
legislatively identified secular harms are harms at all. The argument 
sketched so far would not justify a general principle of institutional 
autonomy, but only a principle of autonomy for those institutions 
whose precepts are compatible with the secular principles the 
legislature cares about. 
The defense of such a general principle therefore must depend 
on an additional quasi-normative proposition: decisionmakers— 
judges in particular—are unable reliably to determine whether a 
religion’s precepts are inconsistent with the legislature’s normative 
judgments. If those administering the law could easily determine that 
a religion’s precepts were inconsistent with the legislature’s 
normative commitments as expressed in its identification of secular 
harms, the first-level argument I have sketched would justify a rule 
denying institutional autonomy to religions whose precepts reject 
secularly identified harms as harms at all.8 
The argument might be extended to justify a general rule of 
institutional autonomy by shifting to a higher level. As presented, 
the argument moved from the actions of individuals within 
institutions affiliated with specific religions (religions with a 
particular set of religious precepts) to the actions of those religions 
 7. Put another way, the argument refers to religions that treat what the legislature 
regards as secular harms as religious harms as well. 
 8. Here the argument is drawn from David Lyons’s classic demonstration that rule-
utilitarianism can be reduced to act-utilitarianism by a careful and complete specification of the 
set of rules that guide action. See DAVID LYONS, FORMS AND LIMITS OF UTILITARIANISM 
(1965). 
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themselves, including their actions in inculcating religious precepts. 
For religions that define harm similarly to legislatures, the net effect 
of recognizing institutional autonomy is the reduction of secular 
harms. Now, simply move up from the subset of religions with 
precepts consistent with the legislature’s to the set of all religions, 
including those who perpetuate or do not discourage secular harms. 
It could still be the case that recognizing a principle of institutional 
autonomy has a net effect of reducing the incidence of secular 
harms.9 
The preceding argument lays out the case for giving autonomy 
to institutions affiliated with religions whose tenets condemn the 
secular harms the government seeks to eliminate. As previously 
mentioned, not all religions have such tenets,10 and excluding them 
maximizes the benefit to society. Conceptually, there is no problem 
with limiting the rule of institutional autonomy by giving the 
“good” religions autonomy but denying “bad” religions the same 
benefit. Institutionalizing such a limitation is another matter.11 
Legislatures and courts are unlikely to do a good job of accurately 
sorting religions into one class containing the “good” ones—those 
whose tenets condemn the secular harms that concern the 
government—and another class containing the “bad” ones. Doing so 
requires legislatures and courts to examine the religions’ tenets and 
match them up with the legislature’s list of secular harms. 
There are undoubtedly independent constitutional reasons that 
give cause for concern over an approach that requires government 
decisionmakers to make some assessment of the content of a 
religion’s belief system.12 Those concerns aside, there is certainly a 
serious question of institutional capacity. Whatever their other 
qualities, the people we select as government decisionmakers are 
 9. That is, when the negative effects of recognizing institutional autonomy are 
subtracted from the positive effects, the total utility remains positive. 
 10. The usual examples that arise in discussions like this—which are uncontroversial 
within the community engaged in the discussion—are Jim Jones, white racist churches, and 
(sometimes) the Nation of Islam. 
 11. Cf. Frederick Schauer, Reflections on the Value of Truth, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 
699, 711 n.38 (1991) (“It is important to distinguish here the theoretical possibility of an 
empirically justifiable sub-class from the possibility that some theoretically and empirically 
distinct sub-class might still not be usable in practice.” (citations omitted)). 
 12. The “church property” cases, such as Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979), imply that 
the Constitution bars governments from attempting to determine on their own the content of 
a religion’s belief system. 
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unlikely to be subtle analysts of the content of a religion’s belief 
system.13 This concern is exacerbated when we note that the content 
of a religion’s belief system is often contested within the religion 
itself: Some adherents will say that the religion condemns 
discrimination on the basis of sex, others that it does not, and still 
others that it does but that the behavior at issue does not fall within 
the religion’s condemnation of such discrimination. 
The conclusion then is that there should be a rule generally 
providing institutional autonomy to religious institutions. The 
“good” religions get it because giving it to them actually reduces the 
incidence of secular harms, and the “bad” ones get it because 
government decisionmakers cannot reliably distinguish between the 
“good” religions and the “bad” ones. And even with the “bad” 
religions included, the sum total impact on society is still positive. 
Note, though, that the case for institutional autonomy is necessarily 
weakened by the extension of autonomy to include “bad” religions, 
because the net impact of providing institutional autonomy is 
reduced when “bad” religions—those to whom providing 
institutional autonomy does not reduce the incidence of secular 
harms—are protected by a rule of institutional autonomy. 
At this point I can bring Professor Scharffs’s discussion into 
mine.14 The argument I have outlined for institutional autonomy 
contains nothing distinctive about religions. It is applicable to the 
entire range of institutions in civil society, including families, 
nongovernmental organizations, and more. The idea of “inter-
independence” that Professor Scharffs develops15 seems to me 
applicable to that entire range as well. That is, a nation’s people and 
the government they authorize to act on their behalf benefit from 
having a vibrant set of civil-society institutions. The institutions are 
independent, but they interact with the government so as to 
 13. This is particularly so when, as is likely, they will be called upon most often to assess 
the content of the belief system of some nonstandard religion—that is, a religion with which 
they are unlikely to be familiar outside the decision-making context. And apart from their 
general ineptness at conducting such inquiries, government officials might be biased in their 
efforts to determine the content of such religions. 
 14. I will not focus here on the many subissues that Professor Scharffs’s treatment of 
inter-independence incorporates. 
 15. Scharffs, supra note 1, at 1253–58.  
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strengthen both the government and the institutions themselves.16 
For present purposes, then, the question arises: Should the rules 
about institutional autonomy for religious institutions be different 
from the rules about institutional autonomy for families or other 
nongovernmental organizations?17 
As the argument I sketched indicates, one might be concerned 
initially about some empirical questions. Without evidence beyond 
their own experience and intuitions, many people seem to believe 
that autonomous civil-society institutions reduce secular harms 
overall.18 We can contrast this belief with the widespread belief, 
apparently almost equal in intensity and scope, that the net 
contribution of autonomous market institutions is negative—that is, 
the belief that the unregulated market has the capacity to cause more 
harm than good.19 People appear to believe that government must 
have the broad power to restrict the autonomy of market institutions 
and ought to exercise that power in a reasonably large number of 
cases, after careful consideration of whether regulation will in fact 
reduce the incidence of harm. 
I confess that it is not obvious to me that civil society’s 
institutions, including religious ones, are categorically different from 
market institutions in this respect. The argument for institutional 
autonomy is that regulation reduces the capacity of institutions to 
inculcate prosocial values and to induce prosocial action. That may 
well be so, but the empirical question is one of degree: Will 
subjecting institutions to regulation reduce their ability to socialize 
appropriately by so large an amount as to eliminate the positive 
contribution they make? Vicarious liability for sex discrimination 
would reduce a religious institution’s ability to socialize its adherents 
 16. Perhaps the European jurisprudence Professor Scharffs surveys is more comfortable 
with the idea of inter-independence because Europeans are more comfortable in dealing with 
the general category of civil-society institutions than U.S. legal scholars. 
 17. One indication that they might not be different is that Professor Gilles’s important 
article on the institutional autonomy of families as decisionmakers has the same structure as the 
one I have outlined for religious institutions. See Stephen G. Gilles, On Educating Children: A 
Parentalist Manifesto, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 937 (1996). 
 18. Consider, for example, the widespread sense that parents ought to have a right to 
decide whether to send their children to public or private schools, or to home school them, a 
choice that is indeed protected by the Constitution. See Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 
(1925) (holding unconstitutional a state law requiring that all children be sent to public 
schools). 
 19. Here the examples are legion: minimum-wage and maximum-hours laws, 
environmental regulations, consumer protection laws, and many more. 
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appropriately (meaning, again, in accordance with the religion’s own 
tenets condemning sex discrimination), but I wonder whether the 
reduction would be large.20 Religious institutions, in particular, have 
proven to be quite resilient over time, in the sense that subjecting 
them to the “regulation” that inevitably comes with living in a partly 
secular world has affected, but hardly eliminated, the effectiveness of 
their communications concerning God’s requirements to their 
adherents. 
A second concern is also empirical: Does providing churches with 
institutional autonomy yield net positive results for society? Here I 
would draw a contrast with the case for granting autonomy to 
families. Regulating the internal operations of families might reduce 
their ability to socialize children appropriately quite substantially. 
Whether the same is true for religious institutions seems to me more 
questionable. For most children, the intensity of their involvement 
with parents is substantially greater—and therefore likely to have 
more powerful socializing effects—than is the intensity of the 
involvement of most religious believers with their churches.21 
Professor Hamilton suggests one way to think about the rule of 
institutional autonomy:22 regulation is not necessarily an all-or-
nothing affair. Perhaps we can identify particular categories of an 
institution’s operations in which regulation would indeed reduce the 
institution’s ability to socialize appropriately. So, for example, 
perhaps eliminating a narrowly defined ministerial exemption would 
greatly decrease a religious institution’s ability to socialize its 
adherents appropriately. That does not imply that reducing a broad 
ministerial exemption to a narrow one would decrease the ability to 
socialize adherents by the same amount, or that denying institutional 
autonomy with respect to one aspect of a religious institution’s 
operation would affect another.23 A decrease in the ability of a 
religion to socialize its adherents appropriately in a given area, due to 
 20. I note that the transition from a regime of institutional autonomy to one of 
regulation might impose substantial one-shot costs (for liabilities built up during the era of no 
liability). Such one-shot costs should be disregarded as we examine the case for a prospective 
rule of institutional autonomy. 
 21. The word “most” is important in both its appearances in the sentence in the text. 
 22. Hamilton, supra note 2, at 1192–96 (discussing the possibility of having different 
rules for sex discrimination in connection with different roles within a church). 
 23. This is how I would rationalize Professor Hamilton’s position on denying 
institutional autonomy for actions that harm third parties. 
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government regulation of the harm, may be more than offset by a 
reduction of harm itself, leaving on the whole a positive balance. 
Here the comparison with families is instructive. Many European 
nations believe that families should not be categorically exempt from 
regulation, because preventing corporal punishment, although 
reducing the family’s ability to socialize appropriately, yields—on 
balance—a reduction in social harm.24 It could be that particular, 
discrete regulations of religious institutions—which are inconsistent 
with a broad rule of institutional autonomy—would have similar 
effects. The question is of course empirical, and we are unlikely to 
get solid evidence one way or the other. 
At this point it is appropriate to separate out a third concern. As 
mentioned earlier, this concern is institutional. As between courts 
implementing a constitutional rule and legislatures defining policy, it 
is unclear which is better able to perform the two tasks that the 
argument for religious autonomy requires: identify and assess the 
relevant empirical information and draw defensible lines based on 
that information. Each institution has its abilities and limitations. In 
our constitutional system, for example, we tend to think that 
legislatures are good at finding and evaluating empirical information 
and that courts, by their development of principled doctrines, are 
good at drawing defensible lines. Yet legislatures are affected by 
limitations on their ability to process information and so may 
develop regulations that sweep more broadly than the available 
information justifies, and courts can be captured by rigid doctrines 
that lead them to apply rules beyond the point where their rationale 
extends.25 Our constitutional traditions incline us to give legislatures 
the final word when this sort of institutional complication arises, and 
I am unpersuaded that the issue of institutional autonomy is one 
about which our traditions are likely to mislead us. In short, it seems 
to me a good idea to leave it up to legislatures to define the contours 
of the rules of institutional autonomy, because they are not likely to 
be worse at the job than courts would be. 
 24. See A. v. United Kingdom, 27 Eur. H.R. Rep. 611 (1999) (Westlaw) (holding that 
the beating of a young English boy by his stepfather constituted “inhuman or degrading . . . 
punishment” in breach of the European Convention on Human Rights). 
 25. My personal view is that it would take a great deal of argument to persuade me that 
the courts in their constitutional capacity will likely do a better job overall than legislatures will 
in devising rules of institutional autonomy for religious institutions. However, I can hardly 
claim to have said anything that should lead anyone to share that evaluation. 
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There is, finally, a third stage to which the argument for 
institutional autonomy can be moved. At that stage the argument is 
that simply acknowledging the existence of a rarely or only 
occasionally exercised government power to regulate religious 
institutions so undermines those institutions’ ability to contribute to 
the secular good that government should be denied that power 
categorically. As my earlier comments suggest, I suspect that making 
that argument convincingly would be quite difficult.26 
To conclude, the argument I have outlined is, I think, what goes 
into a full defense of the idea of inter-independence as applied 
specifically to religious institutions. It seems to me, therefore, that 
the real conceptual competitor to the idea of inter-independence is 
not independence but rather dependence, in the sense of “subject to 
full regulation.”27 It is in this way that Professor Hamilton’s 
contribution complements Professor Scharffs’s, by carefully laying 
out the case for complete dependence and by allowing us to see 
how, even on her own terms, the case for inter-independence is not 
an insubstantial one. 
 
 26. Again, the European experience with the regulation of families is suggestive. 
Europeans appear to believe that the mere existence of government power to regulate 
(exercised rarely, as in the case of corporal punishment) does not overly weaken families’ ability 
to socialize appropriately. Supra note 24. If that belief is correct, it seems to me quite unlikely 
that regulating religious institutions could be worse for society. 
 27. Or, in Professor Scharffs’s terms, interdependence. Scharffs, supra note 1, at 1251–53. 
